This paper develops a relational contracting model to show that fiat -a principal's ability to dictate her agent's performance -emerges in equilibrium under vertical integration, even when integration does not allocate distinctive formal authority to the principal. In a vertical structure, an efficient relational contract requires downstream managers to take actions that maximize aggregate profits, in exchange for future rents. If the manager of a vertically integrated unit reneges, she benefits from greater free time, but does not appropriate the associated increase in unit profits. Therefore, when the actions that maximize aggregate profits and the individual unit's profits differ substantially ! that is, when interest conflicts and spillovers between units are large ! a manager's promise to perform will be more credible under vertical integration than under separation.
Introduction
In the last two decades a strong body of empirical evidence has emerged, suggesting that units at different stages in the chain of production tend to be vertically integrated when the potential interest conflicts between them are strong. For instance, franchisors own retail outlets that generate spillovers on the common brand (Brickley and Dark (1987) , Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) , Yeap (2006) , Arruñada et al. (2008) ), motor carriers own trucks whose poor maintenance would harm the carrier's service and reputation (Nickerson and Silverman (2003) ), and airline companies own regional carriers that serve routes between bad weather airports, in which frequent flight rescheduling preserves the network's reputation but causes short-term losses to the regional (Forbes and Lederman (2008) ).
1
These industries are all plagued by an agency problem: upstream principals (franchisors, motor carriers, airline companies) rely on downstream agents (franchisees, truck drivers, managers of regional airlines) to perform onerous tasks (serving customers, driving efficiently, adapting flight schedules under time constraints), whose benefits are shared between the upstream and downstream units. Importantly, agency is present independent of whether the units are vertically integrated or separated -for instance, a car manufacturer needs the retail outlets' managers to implement service standards and spend sales effort both when these are franchisees, and when they are salaried employees. The question then is: why do agency problems conduce to vertical integration? What exactly does integration do to solve them?
Standard incentive theories (Lutz (1995) , Grossman and Hart (1986) , Hart (1995) ) are not well positioned to answer this question, as they predict that managers in vertically integrated firms, who do not appropriate the residual value of the assets they manage (Krueger (1991) , Maness (1996) ), have scarcer incentives to spend time and effort in production than if they owned the assets. As a possible explanation, transaction cost theory has suggested that agency conflicts disappear in vertically integrated firms, where employers use their power of fiat to direct employees (Coase (1937) , Williamson (1971 Williamson ( , 2000 ), thus "economizing on contracting costs" (Klein et al. (1978) , p. 299).
3 While suggestive, the assumption that vertical integration conveys power of fiat seems often counterfactual. First, some agents' actions are hard to verify in court, so it is unclear how formal authority over them could be exerted in the first place. Second, formal authority can also (and perhaps more cheaply) be allocated via contracts between independent firms Demsetz (1972), Hart (2008) ). Indeed, distribution contracts allocate to upstream firms formal authority on both their employees and franchisees (Hadfield (1990) , Arruñada et al. (2001 Arruñada et al. ( , 2005 , Zanarone (2008 Zanarone ( , 2009 ). Also, contracts between major and regional airlines allocate to the former the right to change flight schedules, independent of whether the regionals are vertically integrated or not (Forbes and Lederman (2008) ).
2 Although property rights models such as Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart (1995) have been mainly applied to study the managers' incentives to increase firm-specific human capital, they can also be used to study the managers' incentives to spend effort in production. See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) , Holmstrom (1999) , and Gibbons (2005) for thorough discussions of this point. 3 See Hart and Holmstrom (2002) and Baker et al. (2008a) for formal models, in which integration transfers control over a firm's decisions, eliminating agency problems altogether. Also, see Masten (1988) and Williamson (1991) for legal arguments according to which vertical integration increases a firm's formal authority to dictate decisions to its managers.
Alternatively, multi-task agency theories have suggested that, by muting the agent's incentives, vertical integration can avoid imbalances in her allocation of effort across tasks.
The problem with these models is that they require specific assumptions, such as agent's risk-aversion (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) , Bai and Tao (2000) ), or agent's willingness to work up to a substantial amount without incentives (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) ), which do not seem to fit many of the industries where agency conflicts lead to vertical integration. For instance, in retail distribution, managers of riskier outlets receive greater portions of outlet profits (Norton (1988) , Martin (1988) , Lafontaine (1992) ), which is contrary to what one would expect if these managers were risk-averse. Also, it seems unlikely that truck drivers, whose job is burdensome and unpleasant, would be happy to drive at the speed and pace required by the motor carrier, without explicit incentives to do so.
This paper provides a novel explanation for why agency conflicts lead to vertical integration, which, unlike the multi-tasking and transaction cost arguments discussed before, does not involve agent risk-aversion, willingness to work without incentives, or transfers of formal authority. The proposition advanced here is that a vertically integrated firm may be able to dictate conflictive decisions to managers (fiat) not by exerting formal authority, but, rather, by making the managers' informal promise to act in the firm's interest more credible. 4 This point is illustrated through a simple agency model, in which two units ! upstream and downstream ! jointly produce a service, and surplus depends on a non-contractible action chosen by the downstream unit's manager. In a one-shot transaction, it is preferable to make the manager own the downstream unit, as that gives her stronger incentives to perform than vertical integration. This is no longer the case, however, when the manager and the upstream unit transact repeatedly and, therefore, canenter relational contracts, in which the manager promises to act to maximize the joint surplus, in exchange for future rents. Under both vertical integration and separation, if the manager reneges on her promise to perform, she benefits from greater free time. Under vertical separation, however, the shirking manager also appropriates any short-run increase in unit profits due to non-performance, because she is residual claimant of the downstream unit.
Therefore, when the actions that maximize the upstream and the downstream unit's profits differ substantially ! that is, when spillovers between units are large ! the manager's promise to perform will be more credible under vertical integration than under separation.
The model also provides a novel explanation for the fact that a greater cost of monitoring downstream managers leads to less vertical integration (Brickley and Dark (1987) , Lafontaine (1992) , Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) , Lafontaine and Slade (2007) , Arruñada et al. (2008) ). Since direct monitoring is essential to sustain relational contracts over the agent's performance, and vertical integration is efficient only in the presence of relational contracts, the model predicts that greater monitoring costs will lead, ceteris paribus, to less vertical integration. This complements the model in Lafontaine and Slade (1996) , according to which, in the presence of low monitoring costs, risk-averse agents should receive high commissions on direct measures of performance, and low commissions on indirect measures, such as sales. The difference is that the prediction in this model is directly applicable to the discrete choice between vertical integration and separation. Also, it does not require agent's risk aversion, whose importance, as mentioned before, seems dubious, at least in retail contracting.
The work most closely related to this paper is probably Baker et al. (2002) , which interprets vertical integration as a means to facilitate relational incentive contracts. The difference is that, in Baker et al. (2002) , vertical integration is used to reduce the principal's and agent's temptations to renege on the informally agreed incentives, by holding up each other and renegotiating the distribution of surplus. As a consequence, their model cannot yield the predictions of this paper on the relation between agency conflicts and vertical integration. In particular, in a model a la Baker et al. (2002) , spillovers from the agent's actions to the principal's inalienable assets -for instance, from an outlet manager's service effort to the value of the franchisor's brand -have the same effect on the parties' payoffs from renegotiation under vertical integration and separation and, therefore, do not affect the choice between these two governance structures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model's definitions and assumptions. Section 3 discusses the incentive properties of vertical integration and separation in a spot environment. Section 4 discusses the choice between vertical integration and separation in a relational environment. Section 5 derives some comparative static predictions. Section 6 discusses empirical works that support these predictions. Section 7 concludes. 
The environment
In this model, the upstream unit is owned by manager U, whereas the downstream unit can be either owned by manager D (vertical separation) or manager U (vertical integration), in which case D runs the unit as U's employee. I assume ownership of a unit conveys the right to appropriate its residual value (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994) , Baker et al. (2008a) 
First best
If effort was contractible, no matter who owns the downstream unit, U and D would agree, at stage 1, that D must choose d to maximize the joint surplus
, in exchange for a payment. The necessary and sufficient first order condition for this problem is
However, since d is non-contractible, U and D cannot, in general, achieve the first best in a spot environment. To achieve the second best, they must choose, at stage 0, between assigning ownership of the downstream unit to U (vertical integration) or D (vertical separation).
Vertical integration
Under vertical integration, U receives, at stage 3, 
Vertical separation
Under vertical separation, U receives, at stage 3,
Anticipating this, at stage 2, D chooses
The necessary and sufficient first order condition for this problem is 
is increasing in d, the joint surplus under vertical separation is
This is the result one would expect from a standard agency model: if D spends more effort, in equilibrium, under vertical separation than under integration, but less than the first best under both governance structures, vertical separation should yield greater surplus than integration. The implicit assumption, here, is that terminating the relationship at stage 2, once production has already started, is too costly. For instance, U may need D to provide some ancillary, contractible cooperation after stage 2 and until the end of the period, and may find it difficult to immediately replace D for that purpose.
Relational governance
After termination, U and D renegotiate asset ownership, and the downstream unit is allocated to its best use outside the relationship. 
Given the above assumptions and definitions, we can derive the conditions that make the relational contract self-enforcing. This will occur if, and only if each party's present gains from reneging are smaller than the present value of her quasi-rents from future trade. 
Vertical integration
With a slight abuse of notation, let me denote U's and D's per period profits from honoring the relational contract, gross of the fixed transfer VI w , as
, yielding joint surplus
Let r be U's and D's common interest rate. Then, the relational contract is self-enforcing if, and only if
Conditions (3) and (4) 
Proof:
The largest VI w satisfying both (3) and (4) (5) and rearranging yields the condition
Since VI w satisfies both (3) and (4), (6) is sufficient for self-enforcement. QED. 
Vertical separation
relational contract is self-enforcing if, and only if
# $ 
Proof:
The largest VS w satisfying both (7) and (8) is
Plugging VS w into (9) and rearranging yields the condition
Since VS w satisfies both (7) and (8), (10) is sufficient for self-enforcement. QED.
Given Lemmas 1 and 2, we can determine the governance structure that maximizes the "self-enforcing range" of a given relational contract (Klein (1996) , Baker et al. (2002 Baker et al. ( , 2008b ), that is, the structure that makes the relational contract self-enforcing for the largest range of interest rates. This is given by the following Proposition 2: For a given relational contract, vertical integration maximizes the selfenforcing range if, and only if
Rearranging (6) and (10) As a last step, we can define the optimal governance structure. For a given governance * + 
Testable predictions

Costly relational contracts
According to the analysis in the previous section, absent relational contracts, vertical integration will not be observed, because it minimizes D's incentives to perform.
Conversely, in the presence of relational contracts, vertical integration will be observed whenever it supports the best feasible relational contract. In practice, relational contracts may be feasible but costly, as they require U to monitor D's provision of effort, and both parties to develop reputational capital and communication mechanisms that enable informal 
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We know from Proposition 1 that vertical integration will be observed only if (14) holds. Moreover, when (14) holds, vertical integration will be observed if it supports the best relational contract model, the probability that vertical integration is optimal is given by
This implies that 10 The results in this section continue to hold for model specifications different from the linear-quadratic one.
For example, they still hold if one assumes
The analysis for the case in which relational contracts can only sustain levels of effort lower than the first best yields qualitatively similar results, and is available from the author upon request. An inspection of (18) 
Evidence on the model's predictions: a meta-analysis of the empirical literature
This section discusses several empirical works that support the model's predictions, the most recent of which are summarized in Table 1 . All of these works focus on long-term business relationships, such as the ones between franchisors and outlet managers, motor carriers and truck drivers, or major and regional airlines, where, consistent with the model, relational contracts are likely to play an important role.
Effect of the manager's performance on the upstream unit (spillover)
Consistent with the idea that, when the manager's actions generate greater spillovers on the upstream unit (b grows) and spillovers are substantial ( connecting US airports with worse weather conditions, and where the major carrier's hub represents one of the endpoints, tend to be served by regional airlines that are owned by the major. In airports with bad weather conditions, it is crucial for a network's reputation that regional carriers coordinate flight rescheduling with the major in order to avoid excessive delays and cancellations (greater b). Moreover, efficient rescheduling matters more to the network's reputation in the major carrier's hub, or in airports where the major operates more flights. Yeap (2006) finds that chain restaurants with in-house food production, dine-in service and high prices, where the quality of customer service and the restaurant's cleanness and comfort are more critical to the chain's brand (greater b), are more likely to be vertically integrated. Brickley and Dark (1987) find that vertical integration is more frequent than franchising in industries where retail outlets serve nonrepeat customers and, therefore, the outlet manager's effort increases the value of the common brand more than the individual outlet's profits (greater b). Arruñada, Vázquez and Zanarone (2008) find that car dealerships in areas with greater outlet density, where a dealer's effort to capture customers benefits neighboring dealers, tend to be vertically integrated. 12 Lafontaine (1992) and Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) find that, in franchise networks, greater value of the common brand (greater b) leads to more vertical integration. 13 Finally, Nickerson and Silverman (2003) find that motor carriers tend to own trucks when they provide less-than-truckload services, in which shipments must be coordinated and, therefore, breakdowns due to poor truck maintenance are detrimental to the carrier's reputation, and when they invest more in advertising to build a brand name 12 An exception to these patterns is Brickley (1999) , who finds no significant relationship between spillovers across retail outlets and the extent of vertical integration. 13 The positive empirical association between brand value and vertical integration can also be interpreted via two-sided agency models, in which integration gives upstream managers stronger incentives to spend brandmaintenance effort (Lutz (1995) ).
Effect of the manager's performance on the downstream unit
The empirical literature also supports the model's prediction that greater productivity of the manager's performance for the downstream unit should decrease the extent of vertical integration. The evidence is consistent across industries, from gasoline distribution (Shepard (1993) ) to footwear retailing (Woodruff (2002) ) and banking (Brickley, Linck and Smith (2003) ). Unlike the one on spillovers, however, this evidence can be easily reconciled with classic theories of vertical integration, such as the ones based on doublesided moral hazard (Lutz (1995) , Maness (1996) ). Therefore, I will not discuss it further
here. The interested reader can find a detailed account in the excellent surveys of Lafontaine and Slade (1997, 2007) .
The costs of relational contracting
The model predicts that vertical integration should be less frequently observed as the costs of entering relational contracts increase. A natural example of such costs is given by monitoring, since relational contracts require the upstream unit to monitor the effort of the downstream unit's manager (although not in a court-verifiable way). The model would then predict that a greater cost of monitoring the downstream manager leads to less vertical integration. Consistent with that, several papers on franchising find that retail outlets that are more distant from the franchisor's headquarters (Brickley and Dark (1987) , Arruñada, Vázquez and Zanarone (2008) ) or geographically dispersed (Lafontaine (1992) , Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) ) ! and, therefore, more difficult to monitor ! tend to be vertically separated.
Another possible interpretation for the costs of relational contracting is in terms of signaling and communication costs, which parties must incur in order to initiate a long-term relationship and reach an informal agreement on their implicit obligations. In particular, one could argue that parties who have transacted frequently in the past can implement relational contracts at lower signaling and communication costs. The model would then predict that, as the frequency of past transactions increases, vertical integration is more likely. Evidence supportive of this prediction is provided by Corts and Singh (2004) , who find that oil companies and drillers that interact repeatedly and, therefore, rely more on relational contracts, allocate residual claims to the oil company!a solution that resembles vertical integration as defined in this paper. 
Conclusion
This paper has developed a relational contracting model to explain why, in the presence of interest conflicts and spillovers, units at different stages in the chain of production vertically integrate. The proposed explanation is that vertical integration may reduce the managers' short-term gains from acting opportunistically, relative to their long-term rents from cooperating with the firm. If the manager of a vertically integrated unit reneges on her promise to perform, she benefits from greater free time, but does not appropriate the associated increase in unit profits. Therefore, when the actions that maximize the firm's and the individual unit's profits differ substantially!that is, when interest conflicts and spillovers between units are large!a manager's promise to perform will be more credible 14 See Corts (2007) for an alternative interpretation of this result.
under vertical integration than under separation. As shown in section 6, a rich body of empirical evidence from numerous industries is consistent with the model's predictions. 
